Abstract: This paper studies the new monetary stance of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) during the Great Recession. We note that characteristics of the post-1997 "Great Moderation" revealed interest rate smoothing as a valid policy option for the inflation targeting central banks. Utilizing econometric analysis on a general form of a Taylor Rule, we search for the relative weights of the objective function of the CBRT over Jan 2010-Dec 2013. We find that over the Great Recession, the CBRT's focus on "interest smoothing" had been maintained; and yet the burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on the foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, weak credibility of the CBRT, lack of a simple policy rule, and noisy policy communications evidence that pre-requisites of the interest rate smoothing are not being fulfilled. Inevitable sharp policy corrections that follow smoothing periods proved insufficient against the voluminous global flows.
Introduction
The art of modern banking is at an impasse. The almost sanctimonious days of inflation targeting (IT) with a primary objective-single instrument 1 under the bi-polar view 2 of a free-floating, flexible exchange rate administration are long gone. Portrayed under the common parlance of Great Moderation, the IT regimes achieved considerable success in reducing both the level and volatility of the rates of inflation at modestly low sacrifice ratios. As the IT framework deepened and elevated to the status of almost global consensus, the (short-term) interest rates came to be regarded as the primary instrument of monetary policy. Given this exclusive focus on price stability via interest rate responses, however, there had been a concomitant common observation that historical responses of the nominal interest rates to shocks had been significantly more gradual and sticky than the optimal policies called for by the efficiency rules generated from intertemporal consumption smoothing (Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey) models. To account for this fact, some authors noted a revealed desire on the part of the IT-central banks to smooth their rates of interest over and beyond the generally stated objective of achieving price stability. 3 Thus, the aforementioned desire for interest rate smoothing has gradually surfaced out as the main underlying motive of the modern central banks (CBs) under the age of great moderation. Consequently, in an attempt to secure investor confidence and credibility, the CBs came to be increasingly constrained to maintain a constant rate of interest in their operations. However, global conditions changed abruptly with the eruption of the Lehman Brothers crisis in late 2008, and the generally accepted monetary policy mantras took a severe hit. Fueled with a series of quantitative easing operations and stimulus packages across the advanced economies, the global currency markets turned excessively liquid. One country after another, the CBs realized painstakingly how the policy impact of their main policy instrument -the interest rate -has diminished as the zero-lower bound eventually surfaced. note). Monetary stability means stable prices -low inflation -and confidence in the currency. Stable prices are defined by the Government's inflation target, which the Bank seeks to meet through the decisions on interest rates taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. (www.bankofengland.co.
uk). (Emphases ours).
2 Recall the seminal arguments in Fischer (2001) . 3 See, e.g. Srour (2001) ; Lowe and Ellis (1998) , Sack (1998a Sack ( , 1998b Drew and Plentier (2000) , Mehra (2001) , Benhabib, Stephanie, and Martin (2003) , and Woodford (2002) for a detailed analysis of measuring the interest rate smoothing. In its most succinct form, the argument is that monetary authorities are assumed to minimize a loss function of the form:
where y t is real output; P t is the price level; and i t is the interest rate instrument. Var(.) denotes the variance of the associated variables, and b 1 , b 2 , b 3 are positive coefficients.
Furthermore, in the developing emerging market economies (EMEs) the CBs faced another dilemma: On the one hand, they tried to take advantage of expanded external global finance, while on the other hand they strived to maintain control against excesses of such flows that risk their external balance and financial stability through the credit channel. Concerns over financial stability and currency wars casted their shadow over the interest rate differentials, causing EME central banks to be more reluctant to apply the interest rate as the main policy instrument. Thus, compared to the days of the great moderation when inflation risks were moderate, objective functions of the IT central banks became rather opaque, while the interest rate as a single, clear tool has been substituted with broader, and unavoidably impervious, macro-prudential measures. Noisy communications aggravated these problems.
The new framework means that many CBs now had to move away from the clear policy prescriptions of a "single objective-single instrument" IT framework.
In the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Crises reaction of the CBRT was similarly no different than many other EMs, i.e.: cutting the interest rates in line with the falling global rate plateau. Meanwhile, macro-prudential measures were employed counter-cyclically in search of securing financial stability.
The smooth start of the "multi-objective -multi-instrument" policy was challenged by the European debt crisis, which brought "high frequency monetary policy" as an inevitable policy choice for the CBRT due to excessive currency volatility. Yet, we read this as a transition period, the gain of which was relative stability of the exchange rate. One shall note that the aforementioned period contrasts with interest rate smoothing. But it does not mark a permanent deviation in the monetary stance of the CBRT due to its transitory nature. Figure 1 also clearly exhibits the Bank's choice for interest rate smoothing emerging back as of second quarter of 2013. As soon as the FED tapering woes casted its shadow over the EM currencies, CBRT's interest rate smoothing intention becomes more visible at the expense of currency volatility. Indeed, CBRT Governor Erdem Basci's own words that describe the implicit reaction function as "we buy interest rate stability at the expense of exchange rate volatility" (emphases ours) help us rest our case.
This statement by the CBRT, prioritizing the interest rate stability regardless of its cost on the price stability mandate through exchange rate pass-through, clearly is at odds with the conventional IT approach. Yet it is important to be studied as it hints a new objective function of the Bank that is being re-tailored in the post Lehman Crisis Era.
Admittedly, "rule-based" monetary policy is fairly new for the Turkish Central Bank. When the exchange rate-based disinflation program was unsuccessfully terminated in February 2001, Turkish economy experienced a severe crisis, paving the way for the adoption of free floating currency hereafter. The stormy days of the crisis triggered a chain of mandatory (not necessarily voluntarily) reforms which included an amendment in CBRT Law in April 2001, giving independence to the Bank. Facing the difficulty of fulfilling the pre-requisites of IT in the immediate short run, CBRT designed a transitional policy period called "Implicit Inflation Targeting" that lasted until 2005.
Formal adoption of the IT came as of 2006. As the great recession culminated after 2008, CBRT initially adopted an "observer" stance, trying to understand and adjust to the post-crisis conditions while easing out the conditions of the IT. Seeing the potential adverse impacts of the quantitative easing packages on the emerging markets through the credit channel, CBRT incorporated a new "financial stability" objective into the IT-framework in 2010, which turned into the fuzzy term "IT-plus" in the words of the CBRT Governor Basci. This "multiobjective" stance necessitated a larger tool-box, as the CBRT strengthened its hand with new instruments; i.e. mainly the macro-prudential measures.
Yet all these were not free from criticism as the Bank fell short of explaining the roles of different tools in the monetary transmission mechanism, especially while delivering a noisy communication. International institutions such as the IMF, credit rating agencies and financial market players found the new monetary stance opaque -to say the least -despite claims otherwise by the CBRT.
In this paper, we try to shed light on the current policy practices of the CBRT given evidence of the de facto interest smoothing attempts embedded into the IT framework. More formally we seek to provide evidence to the following questions: How did the CBRT's policy objectives and strategic instruments evolve since the onset of the Great Recession? Did the post-QE global conditions lead to a change in the responsiveness of the CBRT to different macroeconomic indicators? In particular, how dominant currently is the smoothing motive for the CBRT given the de facto (not necessarily officially granted) reaction function, and how well has it been maintained?
To this end, we utilize a central bank reaction function framework in the form of an expanded Taylor Rule regression, over Jan 2010-Dec 2013. Here our aim is not to reveal the CBRT's official monetary policy rules per se, but rather to document in an ex post sense the behavior of the CBRT under its official guidelines and responses against the conditionalities imposed by the international finance community. We find that with the onset of the Great Recession when significant shifts in the macroeconomic environment have occurred, the CBRT's focus on "interest smoothing" had been maintained; and yet the burden of adjustment fell disproportionately on the foreign exchange markets. The CBRT was unavoidably bounded to follow a multi-objectional, discretion-driven policy stance rather than a single-objective monetary rule. Lack of sufficient information on the monetary transmission mechanism coupled with excessively noisy communications compounded problems of credibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized in four additional sections. Next, we provide a brief overview of the literature on interest rate smoothing to be followed by a short monetary history of Turkey since full-fledged IT. We implement our econometric assessment in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Experiences with interest rate smoothing
There is now a significant body of accumulated empirical evidence suggesting that CBs tend to change their policy interest rates only gradually; and that, they reveal even greater reluctance to initiate reversals. This tendency of the CBs to change their short-term interest rates in sequences of small steps in the same direction while reversing their direction only infrequently (and reluctantly) has often been labeled as "interest smoothing" (Sack and Wieland 2000) .
It was argued by Lowe and Elis (1998) that the interest rate smoothing strategy has been an important part of central banks policies in the US, Japan and Germany. BIS (1998) reached a similar conclusion for Italy, France, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Austria. Interest rate smoothing is evident in emerging countries as well. Csermely and Rezessy (2007) documented the smoothing motive for Hungary. Helmi (2011) shows that Jordan, Morocco, Israel and Turkey use interest rate smoothing while managing their monetary policy. In his quarterly analysis over the period 2002 to 2009, he also found out that smoothing coefficient was high in Turkey's reaction function; and that "foreign interest rates play a significant role in setting the interest rate in Turkey". Focusing on CBRT's "implicit inflation targeting" era, Kadioglu (2006) reported that smoothing parameter revealed a higher response than the responses triggered by inflation misses and the output gap. Comert, Yeldan and Olçum (2010) , in turn, extended the observation period and studied the interest rate policy of the CBRT in the post-financial liberalization and deregulation era (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , finding that "the Bank's interest rate smoothing tendency is the main determinant of its policy in this period".
Several theoretical explanations had been advanced to account for this phenomenon. The first is based on arguments of attaining and maintaining "credibility" in an uncertain and often volatile world of international finance. Monetary authorities often find it more effective to commit to a given level of its main instrument -the interest rate over extended periods of time rather than creating the image that "they are lost in the dark". 4 In order to reduce the risks associated with open capital accounts, the CBs are often committed to follow simple and well-defined rules in the name of accountability and transparency 5 and are conditioned by the markets to avoid frequent variations in its instruments that would cause large swings in asset prices and the financial rates of return. Such swings could cause insolvencies in public debt and might have a severe negative impact in the corporate balance sheets. Finally, persisting uncertainties might force central banks to adjust their interest rates only gradually. There are different types of uncertainties that can be used to explain the interest rate smoothing phenomena. Central banks are uncertain about the impacts of their tools on their economies (parametric uncertainty); the state of their economies (modeling uncertainty); the reliability of existing data (data uncertainty), and the characteristic and magnitude of future shocks (Comert, Yeldan, and Olçum 2010) .
CBRT under the great recession
Turkey's bitter experience with the pegged currency drove the country to a mandatory regime change. After an average consumer inflation of 75% for a decade (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) , the sharp depreciation of TL by 64% after the collapse of the crawling peg (April-February, 2001 ) added further worries about inflation. Hence seizing the advantage of newly granted independence, CBRT chose to adopt "inflation targeting" as the new monetary regime. Yet as inflation came down to single digits, challenges in explicit inflation targeting period turned out to be higher with sticky prices, and CBRT was not as successful this time. Indeed, from 2006 to 2008, CBRT exceeded the official inflation targets in each of the 3 years, bringing Turkey back to double digit year-end inflation as of 2008.
All in all, although Lehman Crisis was marked with low inflation in the world, Turkey can be pointed at as an outlier, with high inflation and weak IT performance of its central bank. This weak performance combined with the chronic credibility gap show that the Bank does not have much room for comfort 4 From a different perspective, Caplin and Leahy (1996) advance a similar motivation. They argue that policy makers do not like frequent and sudden interest rate changes because they do not want to give an impression that they are poorly informed. regarding the inflation and its associated reaction function. Therefore, any monetary stance that avoids inflation risks while focusing on other priorities carries the risk of delivering sharp reactions afterward to compensate for policy ignorance.
Faced with the further complexities of managing capital flows over the course of the QE operations, the CBRT added "financial stability" as an objective as of late 2010. Multi-objective policy stance came with a bigger tool-box. In addition to the existing "policy rate", CBRT added new policy tools such as the "Interest Rate Corridor", "Reserve Option Mechanism", and the "Reserve" and "Liquidity Management" operations.
6
In this period, countries such as Brazil and South Korea were observed to rely more on capital flow measures to restrict inflows while tightening via interest rates. CBRT differentiated itself with heavier reliance on macro-prudential measures to restrict domestic credit and domestic demand while keeping the short-term interest rate differentials as low as possible.
Switching to the "multi-objective-multi-instrument" policy in the Post Lehman Crisis era with the financial stability objective added to the interest rate smoothing motivation of the Bank. CBRT notes that "interest rate levels required for price stability and financial stability are not always the same... under the current conditions, it might not be possible to simultaneously ensure price stability and financial stability by means of policy rates alone".
7 This stance fits the Bank's intention to employ macro-prudential measures more frequently than the interest rate tool in an attempt to balance financial stability and price stability objectives. In February 2011, the CBRT noted that "the monetary stance in this framework is not only determined by the path of policy rates, but as combination of all the policy instruments". Yet, the roles of these new tools in the monetary transmission mechanism remained almost a mystery. This "learning by doing" period in the application of monetary policy moved the CBRT to discretionary grounds, hurting the credibility of monetary policy.
As the channels of communication turned fuzzier amidst an expanded set of policy tools/objectives, the summer of 2013 brought increased volatility to the Turkish Lira (TL) with the worsened expectations of Septapering and increased domestic and regional political tensions. High-frequency data portrayed over October 2011 to the end of 2013 highlight the swings in the paths of the rates of interest (funding cost of the CBRT) and that of the foreign exchange (weighted basket) (see Figure 1) .
It was at this juncture that Mr. Basci summarized the Bank's position succinctly as "buying interest rate stability at the expense of currency volatility". Yet, the existing external deficit of Turkey made this choice highly risky, delivering fragility to the overall economy. Turkish corporate sector had a short FX position of USD 174 bn in 2013 (short term: USD 18 bn). Hence, volatility in the currency carries the risk of hurting the investment decisions, as well as production costs. Thus, the CBRT's tolerance for TL depreciation will inevitably be limited given its negative impact on output as well as price setting. This lack of tolerance sets a certain limit to the smoothing attempts. Next, we attempt to distill the policy responses of the CBRT under these conditions with the aid of an expanded Taylor Rule econometrics.
Econometrics of the CBRT's Taylor rules
Central banks that operate within a flexible, floating exchange rate regime continuously confront the question of the determinants of their interest rate decisions and associated weights. The so-called Taylor Rule set forth by John B. Taylor (1993) stands as a generally accepted and simple form of reaction function description. Given its explanatory powers and rather simplicity in its application by the FED in the US, the Taylor Rule gained wide recognition (see, e.g. Blinder 1996; Yellen 1996) , triggering the motivation to reshape the Rule for other developed countries and also for the developing countries. With these applications, additional explanatory variables had become part of the Taylor Rule, and the literature seems to reach a consensus on the point that "as long as they are not inconsistent with the inflation target in the long run, there can be targets for other variables" (Taylor 2000) .
In this study, we choose to work on a rather simple Taylor rule format that includes a lagged independent variable, namely the interest rate in the previous period:
Here, R t stands for the rate of interest; π t is the inflation rate and (y t -y*) stands for the output gap. The βs are the regression coefficients (policy weights). In this equation if the coefficient of the lagged interest rate is found to be positive but still below unity, it represents a partial adjustment of the interest rates to changes in the other macroeconomic variables. When one sees a deviation of output from the potential or inflation from the target, this particular coefficient tells that a "sequence" of moves in the same direction shall take off until deviation turns into convergence. Naturally, β 1 and β 2 show the "overall responsiveness". Hence now we can re-define the terms of interest rate smoothing: high degree of partial adjustment and limited overall responsiveness.
In our econometric work, we employed monthly macro aggregates from January 2010 to December 2013. We chose 2010 as the beginning of the data set, enabling the study of the impact of newly incorporated financial stability objective on the reaction function. Our data set ends at the latest available data at the time of writing.
We ran our econometric investigation for a dynamic version of the reaction function, seeking the main motive behind the interest rate reaction of the CBRT. Although we employed a standard Taylor Rule approach, we added the dependent variable with its lag to the right side of the equation so as to observe the "momentum" from the last period's fund rate change.
We first regress the model in eq.
[1] to account for the rule of "interest rate smoothing"; that is, the value of β 1. For the interest rate variable, we employed the O/N lending rate as the CBRT's policy rate. This rate also corresponds to the upper band of the "interest rate corridor". For consumer inflation, annual % change of the consumer price index released by Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) is adopted. As we worked with monthly frequency, we employed industrial production to measure the output gap. For this purpose, we used the time series adjusted for the calendar and seasonality effects as reported in TURKSTAT. Potential levels of the series are calculated via the HodrickPrescott Filter, and thus we obtained the output gap as the difference between the actual industrial production and the potential level.
We have conducted unit root tests for each of the variables. For the "Inflation" variable with Ho: a ¼ 1 (unit root probability was found to be greater than 5% and we failed to reject Ho. So in the presence of unit root and non-stationarity, we used the first difference test to obtain stationary series. Output Gap was found to pass the unit root test. "Interest rate": Ho: a ¼ 1 (unit root) probability was greater than 5%; we failed to reject Ho so with the presence of unit root and we implemented the first difference test to obtain stationarity. The same results were valid for lag values of interest rate in the model. Currency Basket was also non-stationary for the unit root test and its first difference, but it was stationary according to the second difference. Furthermore, tests for serial correlation were also carried, as coefficient of the lagged interest rate variable could have been driven by serial correlation. Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM tests carried at various lag structures revealed that there was no serial correlation in the data. Results of these tests are available from the authors upon request.
Regression results are displayed in the first column of Table 1 . We find a value of 0.82 for the lagged interest rate variable suggesting a fairly strong Notes: t-statistics in parantheses: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
smoothing response. The coefficient is statistically significant and the overall model also passes the f-statistic for statistical relevance. Both the inflation and output gap variables are of the expected positive sign with significance levels of 10% and 1%, respectively. Next, we study the policy responsiveness of the exchange rate on the rate of interest at the margin. For this, we add the foreign exchange currency basket (monthly averages) of the CBRT to the analysis. Results are displayed in the second column in Table 1 .
Addition of the exchange rate does not in any way have an impact on the interest-smoothing policy response. The variable has a positive and yet statistically insignificant value with the R t . Besides, all the remaining coefficients, in particular the smoothing coefficient β 1 , remain almost unaffected. We read these results as preference of the CBRT toward interest smoothing at the expense of exchange rate volatility.
Persistence of the interest rate smoothing reaction by the CBRT corroborates with the findings of Comert et al. (Comert, Yeldan, and Olçum 2010) who carried out a similar analysis for the 2002-2008 period. They report that, over the post-2001 crisis era (until the eruption of the 2008 crisis), the CBRT's interest rate smoothing tendency had been the main determinant of its monetary policy. Furthermore, the Bank appears to be responsive (albeit slightly) to changes in the real exchange rate. Similarly, Civcir and Akcaglayan (2010) , utilizing VAR decomposition analyses, argued that the CBRT had responded very strongly to the changes in the real exchange rate over 2001.01 to 2009.05. Accordingly, "too much volatility in the exchange rates were not allowed by the CBRT", and "the interest rate reacted strongly to exchange rate shocks and weakly to output gap, exchange rate has been a relevant variable for monetary policy, which shows the use of a monetary condition index or some form of managed floating" (p. 351).
The contrasting nature of the above results is most probably due to the choice of different time horizons of analysis and also to the differences in the structures of the econometric formulations. In particular, Civcir and Akcaglayan's formulation depends on an extended Taylor rule based on deviations from potential (neutral) levels of the explanatory variables in the following form:
In Civcir and Akcaglayan's formulation (equation 2) π stand for the inflation variable, y is the output level and q is the real exchange rate. The barred items are the neutral levels of these variables and the terms in the parentheses are set as deviations of these explanatory variables (gaps). In any event, the post-2009 reactions of the CBRT seem to have switched to a stronger preference for interest rate smoothing with the exchange rate being left to follow a more volatile course. Thus, TL is observed to be chosen as the gambit while the Bank seeks interest rate stability. Yet, the fragile short FX position of Turkey's corporate sector and high pass through from currency to the consumer inflation show that excessive volatility in the currency carries the risk of hurting stability on the output and price dynamics fronts. Therefore, insisting on flat rates carries the risk of delivering further instability in times of volatile currency. Indeed, this was the case in late 2011 and early 2014, pushing the CBRT to a sharp and unexpected interest rate hikes.
Here, a more interesting issue for concern could be the question whether there are substantial lags of the explanatory variables on the interest rate, implying that the Bank might be following a "forward-looking" reaction function based on expected inflation and expected output gaps, rather than the current levels. Applications in the literature by Gorter, Jacobs, and de Haan (2008) have found, for instance, that the European Central Bank reacted mostly to expected inflation and output, rather than current levels. Belke and Klose (2011) similarly found out that using real-time forecasts, the estimated coefficients on inflation and output gap had revealed statistically significant and higher coefficients. Yet, due to lack of official time series of forward-looking targets on these variables for the Turkish case, we could have implemented only an analysis of forwarddates levels of these variables. This had resulted in minor changes and proved to be quite robust in comparison to the current-time-valued levels of the explanatory variables. 8 Finally, the issue of collinearity is checked for. In our Model 2, the exchange rate (basket) has been introduced as an additional explanatory variable. To test whether the added exchange rate variable is collinear with the other variables, the inflation rate in particular, we first regressed the exchange rate basket to a constant and inflation rate. Then we obtained residuals from this regression and employed them in the original model as a new variable. The results of this alternative specification are tabulated in Table 2 .
We observe that the results from this new regression are quite similar to the original one, showing that collinearity does not pose a serious problem to our analysis. This paper studied the interest rate smoothing behavior of the Central Bank of the Rep. of Turkey (CBRT) across the "multi-objective-multi-tool" policy framework that has been instrumental since 2010. Changes in the monetary stance had been almost mandatory within the global recession era that was triggered by the Lehman crisis, in which interest rates were low all around the globe and capital flows to emerging markets were on the rise. Those conditions delivered undesirable consequences for the emerging market economies through the credit channel and Turkey was not the only country that turned toward an "unconventional monetary policy path". Many other developing countries that faced imbalances due to heavy capital flows, employed macro prudential measures within their monetary policy framework while also striving to keep their interest rates low. In fact for many, uncertainties associated with the Great Recession drove a Notes: t-statistics in parantheses: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
mandatory break from the macro-prudential regulatory approach, bringing unconventional monetary policy approach to stage. Taking the transition nature of the Post Lehman era into consideration, we chose to examine the monetary policy approach of the CBRT within a Taylor Rule framework. Our work focused on finding a relevant monetary approach during a transition period that carried high dose of uncertainty thereby directing our work toward the interest rate smoothing literature which invokes "data uncertainty" and "parameter uncertainty".
Our econometric evidence suggests that, over the Great Recession, CBRT maintained an overall stance favoring the interest rate smoothing approach in its discretionary path, and the role of exchange rate in its policy decisions has been statistically insignificant. A Taylor rule summary of the CBRT's actions confirms the interest smoothing view. Yet, sharp policy corrections that came after periods of interest rate smoothing tell of dangers of policy overstaying. In this respect, we checked for the CBRT's monetary framework and concluded that it fell short of fulfilling the prerequisites of interest rate smoothing suffering from weak credibility, poor communication, and lack of a well-defined simple monetary framework. Therefore, although the global macro-landscape in the aftermath of the Great Recession justified interest rate smoothing as a valid strategy for some countries, in Turkey's case this strategy necessitated sharp reversals over the monetary policy cycle.
